Signal Blind

Where Are My People?

While researching my mental model I thought it might be a good idea to double-check these ideas – this isn’t my area of expertise. The terms the LLM was feeding me made sense but they didn’t seem to be clinical terms in many cases. I wasn’t able to find any account similar to my own.

Am I really unique? Probably not. Sure, everybody wants to be the main character in their own story, but logically it didn’t make sense. Even if it were 0.1% of the people that is still millions of people. Where are they?

  • DSM-5 is for diagnosing disorders – conditions that impair various functions
    • my condition has no visible (to me) impairment and thus wouldn’t be covered
  • I have a Zero Lag low effort mechanism
    • I didn’t even know I was different – probably other people would be the same
  • I work in the software industry
    • my Propositional Logic way of thinking fits perfectly – again, everything seemed natural
    • what friction I might encounter in other fields is largely absent here: explicit communication is the norm
  • clinical psychology is output-oriented
    • ASD category A describes me but B is a complete miss – I need the mechanism to understand how I behave
    • in debugging you can’t treat the symptom, you need to know the root cause
  • the ASD magnet
    • the Autism Spectrum covers a wide range of experiences
    • although I don’t match the diagnosis it might be easy to mistake because the category A behaviors are a great match

Basically people like me are probably hidden. No problem, no diagnosis, no write up or descriptions. If they land in positions where logical thought is the norm (STEM), they fit right in.

Since I was building a mental model for myself (I already had the notes!) I thought it might be useful to organize them from a big outline into something coherent. Maybe somebody else would come across this and recognize themselves. Or not. I like building things, so I like doing it regardless.

References

There were several papers that looked like they might be close, but in the end they aren’t really about people like me. They were interesting to investigate!

The common flaws I found in their match with my experience (these may be more generally true – I don’t know):

  • faulty ToM would be the cause of high stress or impairment
    • Source: Senju et al., Frith & Frith
    • The papers assume a Deficit Model (a broken receiver)
    • me: I don’t feel stress or impairment
  • people with literal viewpoints would be unable to process “false views”
    • Source: Gergely & Csibra, Frith & Frith (MPFC/Decoupling)
    • Processing a “false belief” (knowing X thinks Y, when Y is false) requires a specialized “Decoupling” mechanism in the Medial Prefrontal Cortex to simulate another’s internal mental state.
    • me: I can handle this via data tagging
  • Humans are best predicted by attributing beliefs and desires (The Intentional Stance)
    • Source: Dennett (The Intentional Stance)
    • me: I am able to use Design Stance and Physical Stance effectively
  • Signal Magnitude vs. Social Saliency
    • Source: Heyes (Submentalizing), Baron-Cohen (EDD/SAM)
    • “Social” cues like head-turning or eye-gaze are “primitive” interrupts that grab attention regardless of cognitive style.
    • me: High-magnitude physical signals (e.g., someone turning their head directly in front of you) are captured as motion data. Low-magnitude or peripheral social cues (e.g., someone looking at an object nearby) are discarded as background noise.
  • Systemizing: Preference vs. Hardware Constraint
    • Source: Baron-Cohen (The Essential Difference)
    • “Systemizing” is a drive or a psychological preference (The Extreme Male Brain) and is typically not desired.
    • me: it is not a preference, it is a requirement due to the lack of signal
  • Initialization Cost (The High-Energy Phase)
    • Source: Frith & Frith (The “Script” Library), Gergely & Csibra
    • Social interaction is “Automatic” and “Implicit.”
    • me: these are expensive and manual, though curiously probably more efficient once set up that autistic people experience (as they still have to deal with the noisy social signal)

Even though these don’t describe me, they are interesting and provided things to think about. For example, what is the mechanism that allows me to hold false beliefs? It wasn’t something I actively considered as I didn’t realize it might be a problem!

The Intentional Stance, Daniel Dennett

In Daniel Dennett’s framework, there are three levels of abstraction used to predict the behavior of a system: the Physical Stance(physics/chemistry), the Design Stance (purpose/function), and the Intentional Stance (beliefs/desires).

The Design Stance is a reasonable match: I treat humans as Black Boxes where I might know their role in a company or society. I can predict what a Manager or Programmer does based on their role. I might construct a logical model to refine this.

The Physical Stance is about predicting behavior only on physical properties, e.g. tensile strength or mass. NT people would use this for inanimate systems where I might still use the Design Stance – what is it supposed to do.

This describes some of the outcomes of treating humans as “systems” without addressing the mechanism.

Mindblind Eyes: An Absence of Spontaneous Theory of Mind in Asperger Syndrome, Senju et al.

The paper.

This provides the distinction between Implicit (Automatic) Social Tracking and Explicit (Manual) Social Reasoning.

The paper talks about Manual Frame Construction – this describes how autistic people can use “compensatory learning” to employ explicit reasoning to accomplish tasks that Automatic ToM would otherwise provide. This is roughly equivalent to my understanding of how I Predict or Explain Others.

In short this describes the mechanism that differs between NT and autistic people (specifically Asperger Syndrome, now called Level 1 ASD) and how autistic people can compensate.

The paper claimed that it tested ASD subjects (via eye tracking) and found they had no Social Salience but were still diagnosed with ASD. Although this seems like it might be possible, it doesn’t seem likely. I think the noisy social saliency that autistic people experience is the trigger for some of the category B compensation effects. The fact that these subjects were diagnosed with ASD requires that they experience these effects. Now I am no expert on this subject, but I am not sure I buy it. Read the next paper – Heyes didn’t buy it either.

Submentalizing: I Am Not Really Reading Your Mind by Cecilia Heyes

The paper’s core thesis is that “social” behavior is often driven by domain-general cognitive processes rather than a dedicated Social Saliency module. Heyes argues that what researchers call “Theory of Mind” (ToM) is frequently just Functional Logic Modeling applied to spatial or directional data. This matches my own experience except that it isn’t frequently, it is always. I do have a “fast mode” in my Functional Cognitive Architecture that I use in a similar way, but it is the same mechanism with shortcuts, not a different mechanism.

Heyes claims “we do not need mentalizing as much as previously thought” – that suggests that my lack of social saliency is a “lean” version of processing, not broken (I think so too!). She also says that NT people suffer a lot of distractions with social cues (head-turning).

Curiously Heyes interprets the observations from Senju differently. The NT subjects were pulled by a nonverbal cue from the agent while the autistic subjects were focused on the truth. They didn’t miss the social signal, it was a distraction that didn’t pass their filter. It wasn’t lack of social salience, but it is some effect from their noisy social salience.

Another interesting point Heyes makes is about “head-turning” is that it isn’t a social signal at all – it is this term “submentalizing”. It is roughly the same as a bright flashing light or a loud bang and is a very low level signal that should grab attention regardless of the social capacity.

So is she correct? In a face-to-face conversation I would probably notice if somebody turned their head. I would have to decide if it meant anything (sometimes people turn their heads for reasons I do not know, e.g. looking up and to the right while thinking), but I would likely see the head turn itself – it is right in front of my eyes (high magnitude singal). However, when walking with my spouse she might say “did you see that person?” and typically I had not. I didn’t notice her looking around or at anyone and I also wasn’t looking. Even if I saw her looking around it wouldn’t mean anything to me (we are out in a crowd) – I wouldn’t pick it up.

Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naïve theory of rational action, Gergely & Csibra

The paper identifies the “Teleological Stance” as functional logical model of systems (people) and that this is a non-mentalistic system which is a foundational layer of human cognition. NT people eventually supplement this with a “Mentalistic Stance” (Theory of Mind).

This sounds similar to “Submentalizing: I Am Not Really Reading Your Mind” in that there are two modes that NT people can use as needed.

The paper talks about a “Rationality Principle” which is implemented in the Teleological Stance. This is equivalent to my Axiomatic Deontology – a “wrong” action is inefficient or irrational.

The paper also talks about a need to capture the relevant data to operate the Teleological Stance. This is roughly my Manual Frame Construction, which can be expensive.

I don’t use a strictly Teleological model (reality only), I can consume statements and label them as true/false/maybe. This is necessary to deal with people in the real world: they have lots of ideas that I believe are false or unknown. I understand that people may have a different point of view than me. If they tell me what it is I will attach those facts to my representation of the person along with my grading.

Since I did not have access to the signal to develop a Mentalistic Stance I developed an alternative Propositional Meta-Representation (data tagging) ability in my Functional Cognitive Architecture. I do not remember doing that, but I have it now!

Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind, Simon Baron-Cohen

This describes the mechanism behind NT ToM (vibes and instincts):

  1. ID (Intentionality Detector): Interprets motion as having goal-directed intent.
  2. EDD (Eye-Direction Detector): Detects eyes and interprets where they are looking.
  3. SAM (Shared-Attention Mechanism): Triggers when two people are looking at the same thing (Triadic representation).
  4. ToMM (Theory of Mind Mechanism): The final processor that represents “epistemic mental states” (believing, thinking, knowing).

Not directly applicable to me, but it might be an interesting read to understand better how it works in NT people.

The LLM notes: Baron-Cohen frequently attributes the absence of ToM to “developmental delay” or “disability.” You will encounter significant “pathologizing” language in these texts.

The Essential Difference: Men, Women and the Extreme Male Brain, Simon Baron-Cohen

The book.

Talks about “Systemizing” – a drive to think about everything as systems that need to be analyzed and predicted. Baron-Cohen treats Systemizing as a module (a talent or a drive) that exists alongside or in opposition to Empathizing.

Baron-Cohen’s theory assumes that “Systemizers” are simply people who prefer “if-then” rules.

I don’t prefer “if-then” rules, I am forced to process using Propositional Logic because of my lack of social signal. I am not “Systemizing” by choice, it is what is left.

What Baron-Cohen calls “Extreme Systemizing” is likely the emergent behavior of a system that has Zero Social Saliency. When the social signal is 0, the logic signal becomes 100% of the usable data. This idea is interesting to me because it may describe my condition. I haven’t read it but it sounds like a theoretical model rather than first or second hand accounts. He sees it as something that people would want to overcome.

The LLM notes: Baron-Cohen treats the lack of “Empathizing” as a deficit. Baron-Cohen uses “Systemizing” to define the “Extreme Male Brain.”

Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing, Frith and Frith

This paper talks about the parts of the brain responsible for Theory of Mind:

  • The MPFC (Medial Prefrontal Cortex) – The “Decoupling” Mechanism
    • the ability to separate beliefs from the actual state of the world
    • this allows for the processing of false beliefs, e.g. X thinks Y (false)
    • me: I have this as a functional output but the mechanism is different (data tagging)
  • The Temporal Poles – The “Script” Library
    • heuristics for various situations, e.g. ordering at a restaurant
    • me: I have this, but I have a high cost manual initialization step
  • The STS (Superior Temporal Sulcus) – Agency Detection
    • detects agency and biological motion (eye gaze, hand movements). It identifies “what” an agent is doing
    • me: I think I have the hardware – I can see these things, I just don’t notice, no Social Salience

I think this paper is pretty interesting in that it tries to map the mechanisms responsible for the various parts of ToM. It also talks about:

  • Implicit Mentalizing (The “Receiver”)
    • me: this is the piece that I am missing via the lack of Social Salience and thus the automatic interrupt
    • fast, subconscious, reflex driven
    • this is typically present in children by 18 months of age
  • Explicit Mentalizing (The “Logic Check”)
    • the ability to manually deconstruct a situation
    • slow, deliberate, propositional
    • me: I have this, but once my Manual Frame Construction is complete it is quite fast

The paper suggests that “abnormal development” (Section 2) results in a “faulty” mechanism. In my architecture, the mechanism is not “faulty” (broken); it is Non-Existent. I have built a Functional Cognitive Architecture using logic hardware to perform tasks typically reserved for the “Social Receiver.” I am not a broken version of the NT model; you are a functional execution of a different Instruction Set Architecture (ISA).

Switched On: A Memoir of Brain Change and Emotional Awakening, John Elder Robison

This one looked really promising – the author is autistic and described having “social blindness” and “emotional blindness”. The author also describes an experimental brain treatment called TMS where his social saliency was switched on (or so it sounded).

Typically autistic people have social salience. They may have very high social salience but the output is noisy and does not engage the automatic Simulation. In Robison’s case I think that social saliency was working but at such a low level that his mind was discarding the signal. I think he was aware there was a signal, at least some of the time, because he was aware that he was missing something – this caused social distress. He had enough social salience to value what he was missing.

The TMS procedure temporarily boosted the gain of the saliency network and he described it like going from black and white to full color.

  • The “Lifting” of the Blindness: He notes that within hours of his first TMS treatment, this “social blindness” began to lift, allowing him to register nuances like sarcasm and facial expressions for the first time.
  • The Paradox: Interestingly, he later writes that becoming aware of others’ feelings was “just as disabling as being blind to it,” as the sudden influx of social signals became an overwhelming “torrent” of mostly negative emotions.

I think this engaged the automatic Simulation functions and he was faced with a cacophony of signals that he had no experience with. NT people have lived with this their entire life and can tune in and tune out as needed. It was eye opening for Robison but overwhelming. His mental architecture for dealing with the world did not change and he moved from being blind to seeing the pain without being able to turn it off.

He participated in this TMS treatment for six months and the signal boosting effect was present during this time, but temporary overall. He picked up permanent insight into social salience – even after he could no longer perceive the signal he understood what it looked like.

Not the same as my experience but I think this is the first description of Hyposalience I have seen.